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  It is widely accepted that disparities in education contribute to the poor labor 
market outcomes experienced by ethnic minority groups and consequently to their 
poverty. However, incentives to invest in education are significantly diminished if 
individuals are discriminated on the labor market and precluded from access to 
employment. In this paper we analyze differential educational benefits in Bulgaria 
and compare Roma returns to education with the majority population and the Turkish 
minority. We show that both ethnic minority groups have lower educational levels and 
employment rates than the majority population and that they also have lower returns 
to education. However, the gap in returns to education is much wider for the Roma 
with respect to both employment and labour-market earnings. The evidence suggests 
that this group is more vulnerable to discrimination, with a high percentage of the 
employment gap unexplained by differences in observable skills or characteristics. 
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Introduction 
 
  The Roma are one of the largest and most disadvantaged ethnic minorities in 
the pan-European region. The Council of Europe average estimate of the Roma 
population in the European region is close to 11 million.
2 Of these about 6 million 
live in the territory of the European Union (EU), some 70 per cent of them in the 10 
former communist countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007.  The share of Roma 
in the population of post-communist EU countries averages 4 per cent, reaching 
approximately 10 per cent in Bulgaria. 
 
  The available evidence on the living conditions of this ethnic minority in 
Europe gives a dramatic picture of the situation: poverty and social exclusion are 
widespread, formal employment and education are extremely low, health is poor, 
housing is at best precarious (UNDP 2002, Ringold et al 2005, O'Higgins and Ivanov 
2006). Moreover, not only education levels among Roma are worryingly low but also 
their vulnerability seems to be intensifying: in spite of the fact that younger Roma 
tend to have a somewhat higher educational achievement than older ones, the 
educational gap relative to majority groups of the same age has increased over time.  
 
  It is widely accepted that disparities in education contribute to the poor labor 
market outcomes experienced by ethnic minority groups and consequently to their 
poverty. At the same time occupational segregation or wage discrimination due to 
employer prejudice or stereotyping is considered a good reason for an individual to 
invest in relatively low education (Golbe 1985). Specifically, minority groups often 
enjoy lower benefits from education: not only on the labor market in terms of the 
probability of being employed and wages but also in terms of the quality of education 
obtained. This is the case when ethnic groups can only access ethnic segregated 
schools or poorly funded institutions in remote areas. Factoring in the higher costs of 
education related to inaccessibility of resources for lack of means or borrowing 
constraints that poor often face results in very low benefit-cost ratios for some 
minorities with respect to the majority population, leading to low educational 
investment.  As a matter of fact, recent analyses of the Roma's poor labor market 




  This paper analyzes differential educational benefits in Bulgaria and compare 
Roma returns to education with the majority population and the Turkish minority.  
The Turks are the largest minority in Bulgaria representing almost 10 per cent of the 
population according to the 2001 census (according to the same census data, Roma 
are only 6 per cent of the population). Like the Roma, the majority of Turks live in the 
countryside where they have much less access to infrastructure, work opportunities, 
and educational, cultural and health-care facilities than town-dwellers. In this paper it 
is shown that both ethnic groups have lower educational levels and employment rates 
than the majority population and that they also have lower returns to education. 
However, the gap in returns to education is much wider for the Roma with respect to 
 
2 This number includes 2.8 million Roma in Turkey and 1.2 million Roma in the former Soviet Union. 
Another 1 million Roma live in Western Balkans. For details, see the statistics link at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dc/files/themes/roma/default_en.asp  
3 About 70 per cent of Roma children drop out of education by middle school, largely because school 
holds little relevance to their lives (Gatenio Gabel 2009). 
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both employment and labour-market earnings. The evidence suggests that this group 
is more vulnerable to discrimination, with a high percentage of the employment gap 
unexplained by differences in observable skills or characteristics. 
 
  A quantitative analysis of the incentives to invest in education is important for 
developing sensible policies to integrate excluded minorities. This issue is particularly 
relevant in Bulgaria where the ethnic dimension of social polarization is quite 
dramatic: the share of the non-poor ethnic Bulgarians (56.13%) is 17 times bigger 
than that of the non–poor Turks (3.28%) and Roma (3.29%) (Kovacheva et al. 2005). 
Further, Bulgarian studies have pointed out how the ethnic pattern of poverty has been 
reproducing itself during the post-communist transition. The risk of poverty is highest 
among the long-term unemployed while low educational levels hamper employment 
even in the informal sector, perpetuating the negative cycle of poverty (Pamporov 
2007).  
 
  Some studies focusing on Roma have claimed that their exclusion from 
mainstream society threatens Bulgaria’s economic growth and political stability 
(World Bank 2010, UNDP 2002 and 2005).
4 This claim is based on long-term output, 
employment and demographic projections.  Given the relatively high fertility rate of 
the Roma, their proportion in the general population has been increasing and is 
expected to keep rising over time (Ringold et al. (2005), Koytcheva and Philipov 
(2008)). A similar reasoning could be also applied to the Turkish minority in 
Bulgaria; however, the social exclusion of this minority appears to be less extreme 
than that of the Roma minority.  
 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section I provides information on the 
survey data used in our analysis as well as some descriptive information on the 
different population groups’ educational achievement, living conditions, employment 
and earnings. Sections II, III, and IV report the results of estimations of the 
determinants of educational participation, employment and wages. Section V 
concludes.  
 
I.  Data 
 
  We use data from the surveys collected in the framework of the Generations & 
Gender Programme (GGP). The programme is a system of national Generations and 
Gender Surveys (GGS) and contextual databases, which aims at improving the 
knowledge base for policy-making in participating European and Asian countries. The 
GGS is a panel survey of a nationally representative sample of the 18-79 year-old 
resident population in each participating country with at least three panel waves and 
an interval of three years between each wave. The contextual databases are designed 
to complement micro-level survey data with macro-level information on policies and 
aggregate indicators. 
 
  We use data from the first wave GGS for Bulgaria that were collected in 2004. 
While the main purpose of this survey is to investigate gender and family creation 
patterns, it can also be used to investigate labor market performance. Our sample 
comprises 9,192 ethnic Bulgarian (83.9%), 1,079 Turkish (9.8%) and 686 Roma 
                                                 
4 See similar analyses for Hungary: Kertesi and Kézdi (2006) and (2010) 
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(6.3%) respondents aged 18 to 65 years and excludes other non-specified ethnic 
groups. The share of Roma in our sample is consistent with the 2001 national census 
data; however, it is below the above mentioned mid-range estimate of the Roma 
population  by the Council of Europe (10.3 per cent).
5  
 
  Survey participants self identify their own ethnic group. We identify 
individuals belonging to a minority as those who defined themselves as such or whose 
parents, one or both, belong to a minority group.
6   
 
  The Annex table describes the sample characteristics. In many respects the 
Turkish community seems to be better integrated into the Bulgarian society than the 
Roma minority. Both Turkish and Roma populations are younger than the majority 
population – by 1.5 years and 6 years respectively. This reflects the different 
demographic patterns of the three population groups evident also from the number of 
children per adult and the number of siblings of the main respondent.
7 Gaps in 
education are quite wide: the average Bulgarian adult completed secondary schooling, 
while Turkish adults had a lower secondary level and the Roma only finished primary 
education. Both minorities’ women have, on average, almost a year less of education 
than their male counterparts. A comparison of the respondents’ level of education 
with that of their parents indicates a general increase in schooling years of about 2-3 
years.  Also, the observed similar level of partners’ education is indicative of a very 
strong matching between couples. 
 
  Although basically all the interviewed individuals were born in Bulgaria, 
among minorities only a few respondents declared having Bulgarian as the native 
language (less than 3 per cent of the Turks and 8 to 12 per cent of the Roma) and only 
a few more use it as a language at home. The data on employment status in the Annex 
table reveal large gaps between ethnic groups: employment rates of Roma are roughly 
half of the majority population, while Turks are somewhere in between. The next row 
in the table reports the percentage of workers in low skilled occupations defined as 
plant and machine operators, assemblers and more generally elementary occupations. 
The statistics reveal a highly segmented labor market with minorities, especially 
Roma, concentrated in low skilled positions. A comparison  with the parents’ 
occupation (when the respondent was 15 years old) indicates that the situation of 
ethnic minorities has worsened, considering the improvement in the occupational 
ladder of the majority population and the absolute worsening of the labor market 
status of ethnic minority women. The next 2 rows of the Annex table show the 
percentage of respondents who lived with their biological parents at age 15 and lived 
in a village at that time.  
 
5 The interviews are done face to face in the main language of the country. This most probably 
negatively influenced the inclusion of Roma communities in the GGP surveys. Moreover, samples can 
exclude up to 5 per cent of the target population (UNECE 2005). Unfortunately, exclusions are due to 
frame limitations or practical constraints – such as eliminating remote regions where survey collection 
would be prohibitively expensive. These two survey limitations can bring about a partial exclusion of 
Roma from the survey and - what is even more worrying - they imply an exclusion of the most 
disadvantaged among them, i.e. those living in the most remote areas and/or having the lowest 
exposure to the majority population and to education.  Thus the actual living conditions of the 
Bulgarian Roma may well be worse, on average, than those described in this paper. 
6 This could be another reason as to why the share of Roma in the sample is below other populations' 
estimates. 
7 Roma have a life expectancy of up to 10 years lower than the majority population (UNDP 2002). 
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  The GGS statistics describe the different family and fertility patterns, with 
Roma being less likely to marry legally their partner but having on average more 
children and Turks being somewhere in-between. The low percentage of married 
Roma couples reflects the fact that traditional Romani marriages are not always 
registered;
8 this is evident from the high percentages of cohabiting partners. The 
number of respondent’s siblings would suggest that fertility has been decreasing for 
minorities as well; however, one has to keep in mind that many respondents might 
still be in their fertile period. The next 3 rows of the table describe the labor market 
participation of the different ethnic groups, showing the percentage of self employed, 
those working on a part time basis and the monthly wage in Bulgarian leva. Roma 
workers stand out for working often part time, being very rarely self employed and 
earning only half as much as the majority population. Turks on the contrary are more 
likely to be self employed and basically suffer no wage gap.  
  
  The last three indicators in the Annex table refer to the health and living 
conditions. The table reports the percentage of individuals suffering from chronic 
illness or disability or who are reporting “very bad” health for two large age groups: 
17 to 45 and 46 to 65. While for the younger population there are not big differences 
across ethnic groups, for the more mature age group differences in health conditions 
become considerable, suggesting differences in standards of living. This is also 
confirmed by the following statistics on the percentage of households having access to 
a flushing toilet, or living in dwellings with a leaking roof, damp or rot walls, or/and 
floors. These figures show the dramatic living conditions of Roma: less than a fifth of 
them have access to sanitation, and more than half live in poorly insulated dwellings. 
Again, figures for the Turkish minority place them between the Roma and majority 
population. 
 
II.  Determinants of education 
 
  We first examine the determinants of years of education. The survey only 
provides information on the highest degree obtained. Using a well defined 
classification of educational levels, we convert the degrees obtained into completed 
years of education.
9 Years of schooling are estimated separately for ethnic groups and 
gender by OLS as a function of age and the family characteristics when the 
respondent was undergoing schooling: an indicator for Bulgarian being the native 
language, a dummy variable indicating if the child was living with both parents, the 
number of brothers and sisters, if the family was living in a village, parental education 
and occupation. This last variable captures the income situation during the period of 
respondent’s education. Dummies for missing values are added. The results are shown 
in table 1. The coefficient on age captures the fact that older people have higher years 
of schooling. A quadratic term in age is included to allow the possibility of schooling 
decreasing in the later years of life. The two age coefficients imply that keeping the 
                                                 
8 In some Romani communities arranged marriage, child marriage and forced marriage are still 
prevalent as „traditional practices”.  These traditional marriages often take the form of "custom law" 
marriages. However,  Roma "custom law" marriages are not to be confused with the Anglo-Saxon 
"common law" marriages and are not recognized by the state as legally binding. "Custom" means that 
the couple is viewed as married by the community, relatives and their own but not in the eyes of the 
administration (UNDP 2002, European Commission 2009).  
9 International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) level codes are converted into years 
according to the Bulgarian classification of educational levels. Thus reported years of education refer to 
successful years at school and do not consider repeated years or interrupted studies. 
 5Ethnic patterns of returns to education in Bulgaria: Do minorities have an incentive to 
invest in education? 
 
other factors constant educational levels increase with age until individuals reach their 
late 40’s for men and the early 40's for women.   
 
  Having Bulgarian as the native language is positively correlated with 
schooling, improving the educational outcome by close to 1 year for girls. For 
minority males this indicator is not significant given the small share of the group 
having Bulgarian as native language. As expected parental education (education 
mother M and education father F) is strongly correlated to educational achievement, 
and in particular maternal years of schooling seem to have a more powerful impact on 
educational outcomes of minorities than on the majority population. This is not 
surprising, considering the lower probability of the Turkish and Roma mothers to be 




The OLS regression results  
Dependent variable:  years of schooling. 
  males females 
 Majority  Turks  Roma  Majority  Turks  Roma 
age 0.284  0.464  0.42  0.346  0.561  0.452 
 [0.018]***  [0.075]***  [0.105]***  [0.017]*** [0.067]*** [0.087]*** 
age2  -0.288 -0.525 -0.442 -0.378 -0.702 -0.536 
 [0.021]***  [0.090]***  [0.138]***  [0.020]*** [0.084]*** [0.111]*** 
lang  Bulg.  0.348 0.03 -0.071  0.709  1.318  1.008 
 [0.522]  [0.724]  [0.733]  [0.389]* [0.718]*  [0.502]** 
education  M  0.15  0.25  0.259 0.175 0.257 0.263 
 [0.014]***  [0.054]***  [0.075]***  [0.014]*** [0.049]*** [0.069]*** 
education  F  0.118 0.131 0.235 0.146 0.126 0.263 
 [0.014]***  [0.051]**  [0.069]***  [0.013]*** [0.047]*** [0.064]*** 
low occ F  -0.186  -0.565  -0.044  -0.245  -0.178  0.131 
 [0.081]**  [0.302]*  [0.460]  [0.076]*** [0.283]  [0.385] 
low occ M  -0.214  -0.224  -0.441  -0.152  -0.801  0.063 
 [0.084]**  [0.305]  [0.450]  [0.079]* [0.293]***  [0.374] 
brothers -0.417  -0.347  -0.425 -0.488 -0.472 -0.372 
 [0.048]***  [0.122]***  [0.141]***  [0.047]*** [0.131]*** [0.135]*** 
sisters  -0.259 -0.157 -0.285 -0.279 -0.556 -0.335 
 [0.048]***  [0.121]  [0.143]**  [0.044]*** [0.107]*** [0.110]*** 
with  parents    0.257 0.079 -1.574 0.382 -0.217 -2.962 
 [0.284]  [0.997]  [1.278]  [0.266] [0.804]  [1.634]* 
village at 15  -0.343  0.84  0.742  -0.46  0.471  0.007 
 [0.083]***  [0.312]***  [0.400]* [0.078]***  [0.304]  [0.338] 
Constant  3.994 -1.128 -1.024 2.638 -1.567 -0.565 
   [0.686]***  [1.771]  [2.328] [0.575]*** [1.572]  [2.211] 
Obs  3881 488  283 4795 549  384 
R-squared 0.26  0.25  0.3  0.33  0.39  0.35 
Standard errors in brackets: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: UNECE Generations and Gender Surveys. 
 
  The parental occupational level has a very different impact among ethnic 
groups and gender. Both maternal and paternal low skilled occupation indicators are 
strongly negatively correlated to the majority’s boys and girls education, while they 
have no statistically significant impact on Roma. Most probably the indicators do not 
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provide valuable sources of variation for this group. Interestingly for Turks, paternal 
low skilled occupation is strongly negatively correlated to boys’ outcomes while the 
same is true for maternal skills and girls’ outcomes. This might reflect strong societal 
role models. 
  
  The presence of brothers seems to be more detrimental to schooling than the 
presence of sisters and this is particularly true for girls, who most probably need to 
help their mothers in taking care of the male siblings. Living in a village has a 
negative impact for the majority population while it is positively correlated to the 
educational achievement of minorities. This might depend on the different conditions 
minorities experience in rural versus urban settings. Particularly important might be 
the availability of “special” schools, where most pupils come from minorities. 
Residential segregation is common in Bulgaria, with ethnically homogeneous schools 
accommodating 70 per cent of Roma pupils in the country (ERRC 2004). As a matter 
of fact, Roma children are more likely to be retrieved from schools where they clearly 
represent only a minority. Special schools seem to be much more common in rural 
areas where the Roma and Turks concentrate. However, special schools tend to have 
substandard facilities and curricula and in general provide education of inferior 




III.   Employment returns to education 
 
  In this section we analyze employment returns to education and their 
differential importance for the ethnic groups’ labor market participation. We first 
show OLS regressions by groups and by gender of employment status on years of 
schooling, age, family characteristics, health status, the average (over the last 5 years) 
regional unemployment rates capturing the variation in provincial economic 
environment, and an indicator for those provinces where Roma presence is above the 
national average.
11 A linear probability model is preferred for the simpler 
interpretation of coefficients, especially for the analysis of the differential 
employment returns of education.
12 We estimate linear probability models of the 
following form separately for each group and gender: 
 




                                                 
10 Teachers are not trained to teach students who may be of a different culture, which contributes to 
prejudice and ill-informed views as to the capacity and willingness of minorities children to learn, 
leading to low academic expectations (ERRC 2004). 
11 Given the objectives of the study, age rather than the more commonly included potential experience 
(age minus years of education) is used. An alternative is to use potential experience and instrument it 
with age. Using age directly provides more precise estimates albeit of a different parameter. 
12 Linear probability models cannot be correctly specified if there are unbounded right-hand-side 
variables. On the other hand, when right-hand-side variables are dummies that cover mutually 
exclusive categories, the model is saturated, and linear probability models are correctly specified and 
are, in fact, equivalent to probit and logit models. The model in fact includes almost only dummies. 
Moreover, the  unconditional probabilities are in the middle range. Marginal effects of probit estimates 
are virtually identical to the coefficient shown in tables 2 and 3 and are available from the authors. In 
table 3 we take account of endogenous schooling and health conditions using a simple 2SLS. While a 
biprobit estimation is more efficient, 2SLS imposes less restrictive assumptions on the error structure 
while being consistent (Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005), Angrist (2001)).  
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1 = E  iff  ,  0
* > E
where E is the observed employment status of individual i, equal to 1 if employed and 
0 otherwise, and E* is the latent variable representing the ‘tendency’ to be employed, 




OLS regression results 
Dependent variable employment 
  Males Females 
   Majority Turks  Roma  Majority Turks  Roma 
Yrs of schooling  0.028 0.028 0.016  0.03  0.03  0.017 
  [0.003]*** [0.006]***  [0.007]**  [0.002]***  [0.005]***  [0.005]*** 
age  0.075 0.051 0.046  0.105  0.05  0.056 
  [0.004]*** [0.012]*** [0.016]***  [0.003]***  [0.010]***  [0.010]*** 
age2  -0.097 -0.064 -0.062  -0.131  -0.059  -0.063 
  [0.004]*** [0.014]*** [0.021]***  [0.004]***  [0.013]***  [0.013]*** 
Nr Children  -0.006 -0.046 -0.009  -0.015  -0.01  -0.034 
  [0.009] [0.019]** [0.020]  [0.007]**  [0.019]  [0.014]** 
Co-resident partner  0.116 0.131 0.038 -0.017 0.019  -0.01 
  [0.019]*** [0.059]**  [0.075]  [0.014]  [0.050]  [0.052] 
Poor health  -0.132 -0.247 0.006  -0.105  -0.084  -0.156 
  [0.019]*** [0.052]***  [0.080]  [0.016]***  [0.052]  [0.056]*** 
Speak Bulgarian  0.21 0.067  0.057 -0.047  -0.004 0.008 
  [0.110]* [0.068]  [0.082]  [0.104]  [0.068]  [0.049] 
rural  -0.063 -0.042 0.044  -0.052  -0.071  -0.042 
  [0.017]*** [0.042]  [0.054]  [0.016]*** [0.041]*  [0.040] 
Provincial Unempl   -0.007 -0.012 -0.004  -0.004  -0.01  -0.012 
  [0.002]*** [0.005]**  [0.007]  [0.002]***  [0.005]**  [0.005]** 
Roma concentration  0.008 0.042 -0.126 0.011  0.058  -0.054 
  [0.015] [0.053]  [0.068]* [0.013]  [0.052]  [0.049] 
Constant  -1.15 -0.551  -0.512 -1.539 -0.673 -0.679 
   [0.131]*** [0.215]**  [0.265]*  [0.120]*** [0.176]*** [0.172]*** 
Observations  4118  511 295 5073 568  391 
R-squared  0.24  0.18 0.1  0.29 0.14 0.17 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: UNECE Generations and Gender Surveys. 
 
  For Roma males the ability of the model to explain their employment 
probability is quite poor with a R-squared of only 10 per cent; moreover, almost no 
variable is statistically significant with the exceptions of age and education. For 
women on the contrary the number of children in the household and the health status 
are able to  increase the fit of the model partly explaining the low labor market 
participation. This is quite in line with results in papers performing similar exercises 
like O'Higgings (2010) or Kertesi and Kezdi (2010). Geographic differences are likely 
to play an important role in explaining minorities' employment. This is because 
minorities tend to live in rural areas and remote villages, which are characterized by 
higher unemployment.  Adding a full set of provincial dummy variables indeed raises 
the ability of the model to explain the variation of employment probability for Roma 
males as captured by the R-squared (going up to 19 per cent), however when one 
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accounts for the additional number of covariates used, the resulting R-squared 
(adjusted) is back to 9-10 per cent.  
 
  Nevertheless, the results of this regression are interesting per se, especially for 
what regards the schooling coefficient. While returns to education are relatively 
similar for the majority population and Turkish minority, they are about one third to 
over 40 percent lower for Roma. One additional year of schooling raises the 
probability of being employed by about 3 per cent for the first two groups while for 
the Roma this increases chances to be employed by less than 2 per cent. Differences 
in returns between genders are minimal. Usually the employment returns are higher 
for females; in Bulgaria this is true only for the majority population and Turkish 
minority.   
 
  The probability of employment rises with age although reaching a peak around 
37 years for majority and Roma and around 40 years for Turkish men. The maximum 
talks longer to achieve for females ranging from 40 years for the majority to 44 years 
for Roma women. The number of children reduces the probability of employment 
more for women than men while the opposite is true for the presence of co-resident 
partners.  Suffering from a disability or illness, as well as reporting poor health 
negatively influences the probability to be employed, except for Roma males. 
Speaking Bulgarian at home does not really have any significant effect on the 
employment chances especially for minorities. This can be due to the concentration of 
minorities in low skilled/manual occupations which do not require communication 
skills.
13 Given the insignificance of the language variable it will not be included in the 
next estimates to keep the model parsimonious. Provincial unemployment rates also 
negatively influence the probability to be employed for all groups examined with the 
exception of Roma males. We use averages of the 2000-9 period to avoid problems of 
selection, with workers moving to booming regions. However, looking at the dates 
when the households moved into the current accommodation, it is clear that the 
majority of the population is not moving in response of crises and that internal 
migration is not common.
14 
 
  Assuming homogeneous returns to education across degrees, i.e. averaging 
over the academic career the impact of each year of school on the probability of being 
employed, leads to a quite unrealistic result that one year spent in primary school 
would have the same return as one year at university.  Differences in returns to 
employment across degrees might well be very important, especially for minorities 
that have a relatively low educational participation and usually complete only primary 
or secondary education. To describe such differences, we show in the following table 
the same labor supply regression including instead of total years of education 
dummies for last degree obtained: primary (8 years), secondary (12 years), and 
tertiary (16 or more). The reference category is no education. 
 
 
                                                 
13 ERRC (2006) reports that the jobs most Roma do are at the bottom end of the labor market; low-level 
menial jobs. However, only a very small number of Roma work in restaurant/hotel type work or in 
shops, which is surprising given that such occupations usually offer some unqualified opportunities for 
people at the lower end of the labor market.  ERRC evidence suggests that Roma are excluded from 
employment involving contact with the public or with food.  
14 Using 2009 provincial unemployment rates is not affecting the results significantly. 
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Table 3 
OLS regression results 
Dependent variable employment 
  Males Females 
   Majority Turks  Roma Majority Turks  Roma 
Primary  -0.105 0.172 0.119 0.218 0.072 0.061 
  [0.123] [0.084]**  [0.061]*  [0.088]** [0.065]  [0.042] 
Secondary  0.078 0.261 0.203 0.365 0.259 0.212 
  [0.123] [0.087]***  [0.106]*  [0.087]***  [0.076]***  [0.083]** 
Tertiary  0.15 0.7  -  0.478  0.538  - 
  [0.123] [0.092]***    [0.087]***  [0.097]***   
age  0.074 0.055 0.047 0.104 0.055 0.059 
  [0.004]*** [0.011]*** [0.016]*** [0.003]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** 
age2  -0.095 -0.069 -0.061  -0.13  -0.067 -0.067 
  [0.004]*** [0.013]*** [0.022]*** [0.004]*** [0.012]*** [0.013]*** 
Nr Children  -0.007 -0.049 -0.012 -0.015 -0.014 -0.037 
  [0.009] [0.019]** [0.020] [0.008]** [0.019]  [0.014]*** 
Co-resid. partner  0.116 0.127 0.035 -0.017 0.023 -0.005 
  [0.019]***  [0.059]**  [0.075] [0.014] [0.050] [0.053] 
Poor health  -0.131 -0.257 -0.016 -0.105 -0.085  -0.16 
  [0.019]***  [0.052]***  [0.081]  [0.016]*** [0.051]* [0.056]*** 
rural  -0.063 -0.042 0.057  -0.05  -0.048  -0.04 
  [0.016]*** [0.043]  [0.054] [0.016]*** [0.042]  [0.040] 
Prov. Unempl   -0.007 -0.012 -0.005 -0.004 -0.009 -0.013 
  [0.002]***  [0.005]**  [0.007]  [0.002]*** [0.005]* [0.005]*** 
Roma concentr.  0.006 0.038 -0.13 0.011 0.048 -0.051 
  [0.015] [0.053]  [0.068]*  [0.013] [0.053] [0.048] 
Constant  -0.623 -0.527 -0.503 -1.551 -0.641 -0.676 
  [0.141]***  [0.218]**  [0.270]*  [0.110]*** [0.174]*** [0.173]*** 
Observations  4116 511  293 5068 568  390 
R-squared  0.25 0.18 0.09 0.29 0.15 0.16 
Robust standard errors in brackets         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
Source: UNECE Generations and Gender Surveys. 
 
  From table 3 it is clear that for minorities, secondary education has an 
important positive impact on employment, raising the probability of being employed, 
in comparison to someone without education, by about 26 per cent for Turkish males 
and 20 per cent for Roma males. The marginal effect of primary education on the 
employment of the Roma may well reflect the substandard quality of their primary 
schooling. As a matter of fact, Roma children are often segregated into either Roma-
only schools and classes or sent to special schools for children with developmental 
problems; both types of segregation have been shown to result in poor quality 
education and low performance on national tests (UNICEF 2010). The reasons which 
lead to this educational segregation are various and also include language barriers. 
However, Romani children often do not even have the chance to start at a 
regular/mainstream school.  In Bulgaria the so-called Romani ghetto schools were 
established especially for Romani children and are located in or close to the 
segregated ghetto-like Romani neighborhoods. In addition to these, a number of 
schools, primarily schools located in villages, have become predominantly Romani or 
all-Romani due to demographic shifts in the past decade. Although the all-Romani 
ghetto schools follow standard curriculum, and are formally categorized as regular 
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schools, the material conditions and the quality of education in them are markedly 
inferior as compared to other mainstream schools attended primarily by non-Romani 
students (ERRC 2004). The inferior quality of education is likely to deter prospective 
employers from hiring Roma and thus could partly explain the insignificant return to 
primary education for minorities that are unable to access mainstream schooling.  
 
  For males from the majority population none of the three education degrees 
seems to have a positive and significant impact on employment; this is due to the 
negligible share of population with no education chosen as a base for comparison and 
to their high labor market participation at all educational levels. For females from the 
majority population on the contrary, employment returns to education seem to be very 
high and rising with the degree achieved, reaching almost 48 per cent for the college 
educated women.  
 
  We now look at the differential impact of education on employment for the 
different groups, interacting years of schooling with ethnic group. In doing this we 
take account of endogeneity of years of schooling and poor health conditions. 
Statistical endogeneity results from unobserved determinants of education that also 
influence employment. This typically occurs when education (and indeed all forms of 
human capital) is in part the result of constrained optimizing decisions made within 
the household. As such, the decision to attend school depends on market conditions 
and public services outside the household, as well as preferences and resource 
constraints within the household. To the extent that there exist unobservables that 
influence both education and the probability to be employed or the wage rate, the 
error terms will be correlated and OLS estimates of the coefficient on education will 
be biased by this correlation. Therefore,  biased estimates of returns  are unlikely to 
capture the effect of education on employment or earnings, an issue of significant 
concern to policymakers. The following analysis aims to correct for the estimation 
bias. 
 
  Household level characteristics observed when the respondent was 15 years 
old are used as instruments for completed education. These include the variables 
analyzed in the determinants of education: an indicator of household location: if it was 
in a village, and some variables reflecting the household size and composition: the 
number of siblings and if the child was still living with the parents at 15.  Both 
mother's and father's completed educational levels are used. These can influence child 
schooling in a variety of ways. First, they serve as a proxy for permanent income 
(especially paternal education). Second, they may reflect parental preferences. Third, 
they may affect the education production process. Parental occupations, which are 
highly correlated with these two, have also been considered and do not change the 
results substantively. They are excluded in order to keep the analysis parsimonious. 
We also use partner education, which we found highly correlated among partners. In 
fact, recent work (Weiss, 1999 and Chiappori et al, 2009 ) suggest that marriage is 
subject to assortative mating even for the majority population while Stewart (2009) 
reviews recent evidence supporting the idea that assortative matching is a common 
practice for ethnic minorities. The validity of the instruments proposed depend on 
whether spousal or parental education does affect employment and wage rates. 
Spousal education or parental background might influence husband’s/son’s education 
through nepotism or networks effects. However, parental and spouse background 
 11Ethnic patterns of returns to education in Bulgaria: Do minorities have an incentive to 
invest in education? 
 
information has been adopted as instruments elsewhere, and, more importantly, its 
validity is ultimately an empirical question.   
 
  Investment in schooling is not the only form of human capital investment that 
individuals undertake. Health is arguably important in the decision to participate in 
the labor market and probably influences wages as well. Thus the omission of health 
may lead to biased estimates. To measure health we use an indicator which is equal to 
one in the presence of a disability or a long standing/chronic illness or if self reported 
health status is “very bad”. As this indicator is only capturing severe health conditions 
it is arguably only influencing labor market participation decisions. As a consequence, 
we will control for it in the employment equation and we use it to control for selection 
in the wage equations.  
 
  As with schooling decisions, investments in health and their subsequent 
outcomes will also be endogenous. This is particularly likely for short term measures 
like the self-reported current health status. While it is possible that current health 
influences labor market participation or wages, there may also be a feedback effect 
whereby current earnings affect consumption patterns, nutritional intakes, and health 
of workers. Instruments for the health measure include indicators of sanitation, and 
housing quality, the number of disabled household’s members, and provincial level 
indicators of the number of physicians per population, number of hospitals and 
provincial number of deaths for cardiovascular reasons.
15 Quality of housing and 
sanitation determine the hygienic conditions in which household members live 
influencing their health conditions.
16 They are supposed to influence employment and 
wages only indirectly through health. We then add the number of disabled household 
members, excluding the respondent, because genetic predispositions could run in the 
family. In fact, in the case of ethnic minorities in Bulgaria, endogamous marriage 
seems to be the norm (Pamparov 2007). This could account for a relatively high 
genetic predisposition to disease (Luba et al, 2005).  
 
  The model we are going to estimate is the following: 
i Si S i i




ε ρ β α
+ + =




1 = E  iff  ,  0
* > E
where the first line is the labor equation analyzed earlier. Common to both equations 
the set of covariates   includes age and age squared, number of children, an 
indicator showing whether a co-resident partner is available, the average 
unemployment rate in the district, an indicator individuating districts with a high 
proportion of Roma population, and ethnic dummies.   includes   and the 
instruments described above, measured when the individual was 15: an indicator 
E X
S X E X
                                                 
15 Cardiovascular diseases are the leading cause of death for working age population in Bulgaria (data 
from Bulgarian National Statistical Institute).  
16 A significant factor contributing to bad health and a high early mortality rate is poor living 
conditions. According to the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute, almost half of the Roma 
population lacked potable water in their homes in 2001, and one fifth of Roma people live in homes 
where they have less than 4 sq. m. per capita. Lack of proper hygiene and overpopulation are the cause 
of infectious disease and epidemics (Fundación Secretariado Gitano (2009)). 
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showing whether  the household was in a village, and some variables reflecting the 
household size and composition: the number of siblings and if the child was still 




OLS and 2SLS regression results 
Dependent variable employment 
 OLS  2SLS 
   males females males females males females males females 
Schooling 0.031  0.032  0.03  0.031 0.04  0.03 0.044  0.027 
 [0.003]***  [0.002]***  [0.003]***  [0.002]***  [0.006]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.005]*** 
T*school -0.001  -0.01  -0.002  -0.01  0.013 -0.009 0.006 -0.011 
  [0.006] [0.005]* [0.006] [0.005]* [0.012] [0.009] [0.012] [0.009] 
R*school -0.016  -0.017  -0.016  -0.017 -0.028 -0.015 -0.033 -0.017 
  [0.007]** [0.006]*** [0.007]** [0.006]*** [0.013]** [0.010] [0.013]** [0.010] 
Health     -0.133  -0.105     -0.18  -0.203 
     [0.016]***  [0.014]***     [0.096]*  [0.092]** 
Turk -0.06  0.041  -0.051  0.041 -0.176 0.029 -0.088  0.04 
  [0.066] [0.055] [0.065] [0.055] [0.130] [0.094] [0.131] [0.093] 
Roma -0.07  0.004  -0.066 0 0.064  -0.02  0.135  -0.023 
  [0.062] [0.049] [0.062] [0.049] [0.114] [0.085] [0.113] [0.085] 
age 0.073  0.099  0.072  0.099  0.069 0.1 0.067  0.099 
 [0.003]***  [0.003]***  [0.003]***  [0.003]***  [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** 
age2 -0.095  -0.125  -0.092  -0.122 -0.091 -0.126 -0.086 -0.122 
 [0.004]***  [0.004]***  [0.004]***  [0.004]***  [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.004]*** 
children -0.017 -0.021 -0.018 -0.021 -0.013 -0.022 -0.014 -0.022 
  [0.008]** [0.006]*** [0.008]** [0.006]***  [0.008]* [0.007]*** [0.008]* [0.007]*** 
partner 0.124  -0.007 0.12 -0.011 0.119 -0.006 0.113 -0.015 
 [0.017]***  [0.014]  [0.017]***  [0.014]  [0.017]*** [0.014] [0.017]*** [0.014] 
rural -0.049  -0.055  -0.048  -0.054 -0.037 -0.059  -0.03  -0.056 
 [0.014]***  [0.014]***  [0.014]***  [0.013]***  [0.016]** [0.015]***  [0.016]*  [0.015]*** 
Unempl   -0.007  -0.006  -0.007  -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 
 [0.002]***  [0.001]***  [0.002]***  [0.001]***  [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** 
H Roma   0.002  0.012  0.001  0.011 0.004 0.012 0.004  0.01 
  [0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013] 
Constant -0.923  -1.497  -0.887  -1.475 -0.992 -1.479 -0.989  -1.44 
 [0.068]***  [0.060]***  [0.067]***  [0.059]***  [0.083]*** [0.069]*** [0.084]*** [0.073]*** 
Obs  4924 6032 4924 6032 4924 6032 4922 6028 
R-squared 0.24  0.29  0.25  0.3 0.23  0.29  0.044  0.027 
First stage statistics  Partial R2  Partial R2  Partial R2  Partial R2 
Schooling          0.2237 0.2586 0.2391 0.2735 
T*school          0.2518 0.3595 0.2566 0.3625 
R*school          0.3213 0.3532 0.3219 0.3563 
Health         0.0316  0.033 
         F(12,4898) F(12,6008) F(12,4889) F(12,5997) 
Schooling          117.58  174.62 80.85 118.81 
T*school          137.35  281.07 88.83 179.47 
R*school          193.21 273.38 122.12 174.72 
Health         8.39  10.76 
Source: UNECE Generations and Gender Surveys. 
 
                                                 
17 Estimates of E which include the health status involve the estimation of a third equation for health. 
Instruments for the health status are explained in the text. 
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  In table 4 it is evident that the difference in returns to years of schooling we 
found in the previous regressions is statistically significant for Roma. There are no 
statistically significant differences in educational returns for the Turkish minority. In 
OLS when the health indicator is added, coefficients on schooling decrease, 
suggesting that they are correlated with health conditions.  Once we instrument 
education point estimates of schooling returns increase for the male majority 
population while the difference with the Roma minority widens. This is in line with 
the argument of Card (1999) and others that OLS estimates are biased downwards 
because individuals with high discount rates choose low levels of schooling, which 
have a higher marginal rate of return.  
 
  On the contrary for females 2SLS education coefficients decrease making the 
difference among ethnic groups less statistically significant. This would be more 
consistent with the omitted variable bias, namely ability. The coefficient for Roma 
females is relatively high and goes in the right direction but it is imprecisely 
estimated, with standard errors quite big.  The coefficient on health increases in the 
2SLS estimates. This can be due to weak instruments, and it is confirmed by low first 
stage statistics (both the partial R-squared and the F-test) for the health indicator.  
 
 
Employment gap decomposition 
 
  We take a look at the relative importance of education and individual 
characteristics to explain employment gaps. We decompose employment gaps using 
the Blinder and Oaxaca methodology. The next table shows the results of this 
decomposition using the model estimated above and controlling for schooling 
endogeneity. In this case we run 2SLS regressions separately for each group and 
gender to decompose the gap between Turkish and Roma minorities and the majority 
population of the same gender. 
 
  The first row of the table reports the raw employment gap of the minorities’ 
groups with respect to the majority population. The first set of variables and 
coefficients listed under the heading “Explained” measures the difference that is due 
to the different characteristics of the minority group with respect to the majority 
population (i.e. less education, younger, etc.). It is also called “endowment term.” 
That means that if the regression coefficients in the minorities’ samples were the same 
as the majority coefficients, the employment rate differentials would be equal to the 
figure shown in the row “total explained”. 
 
  The unexplained part reflects differences in coefficients and is usually 
attributed to discrimination, and other unobserved differences for example in 
education quality, other skills and/or preferences. The most important element in the 
endowment term is due to differences to education. It accounts for more than 75 and 
65 per cent of the employment gap for Turkish and Roma males respectively, and for 
almost 50 per cent for females. This is surprising considering that no indicator for 
education quality is used; presumably having that information would allow explaining 
even a bigger proportion of the employment gap. Age differences work slightly in 
favor of minorities, as they are younger. The presence of children negatively 
influences more females than males. Working in a rural environment or in an 
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economically depressed province also contributes to the gap.
18 It is evident that the 
unexplained gap is wider for Roma than for Turkish males, pointing to the possibility 
that Roma are more discriminated or more excluded. In the case of females, levels of 
discrimination are similar across ethnic groups.  
 
Table 5 
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of employment gaps 
  males females 
    Turks Roma Turks Roma 
employment  gap  16.7 36.0 21.6 39.0 
Explained      
schooling  12.5 23.7 10.4 18.8 
health  conditions  0.4 0.2 0.2 -0.5 
age  -2.2 -2.5 -1.2 1.5 
Nr  of  children  0.2 0.4 0.9 1.5 
Co-resid. partner  -1.4  -1.6  0.1  0.2 
rural  1.8 1.5 2.2 2.0 
Unempl  rate  1.3 1.4 1.0 0.8 
High  Roma  -0.0 -0.3 -0.0 -0.  3 
      
Total  explained  12.6 22.9 13.5 24.0 
percentage 
explained  75.3 63.5 62.6 61.4 
      
Total  unexplained 4.1 13.1 8.1 15.1 
Source: UNECE Generations and Gender Surveys. 
  
 
IV.  Earnings returns to education 
 
  In this sub-section we examine the earnings returns to education. Table 6 
shows OLS regression estimates of log earnings on a series of variables influencing 
income: years of schooling, age, indicators for being self employed, working part-
time, and in a public company, rural and high Roma province indicators, and the 
average provincial unemployment rate.  
 
  For males from both minorities returns to education are about 30 to more than 
50 per cent lower, while minorities’ females do not seem to have any significant 
return to education at all. Being self employed implies higher earnings for most 
groups, while working part time clearly reduces income. Majority population workers 
earn a lower salary in the countryside; on the contrary, minority workers achieve 
higher earnings in the countryside. This could suggest that in general earnings are 
lower in rural areas irrespective from the ethnic group.  
 
  The economic cycle negatively influences earnings of almost all groups with 
the exception of male Roma. Provinces with a high concentration of Roma also seem 
to be characterized by lower wages, at least for majority workers. 
                                                 
18 Inserting a whole set of provincial dummies significantly increases the percentage of gap explained 
for Roma males to 67.2 per cent, slightly reduces it for Turkish males (73.3) and females (56.5) and 
leaves it roughly unchanged for Roma females. This indicates that geographic differences are an 
important factor to understand Roma males' employment gap. 
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OLS regression results 
Dependent variable log earnings 
  Males Females 
   Majority Turks  Roma Majority Turks  Roma 
Yrs school  0.067 0.046 0.032 0.066 0.012 0.017 
  [0.006]*** [0.015]***  [0.015]**  [0.004]***  [0.013]  [0.014] 
age  0.038 0.01 0.032  0.027  0.033  0.013 
  [0.007]*** [0.025]  [0.026] [0.006]*** [0.047]  [0.026] 
age2  -0.049 -0.011 -0.062 -0.031 -0.045 -0.028 
  [0.009]*** [0.031]  [0.036]*  [0.008]*** [0.069]  [0.035] 
Self-empl.  0.247 0.494  0.49  0.164 0.974  0 
  [0.043]***  [0.185]*** [0.420] [0.038]***  [0.255]*** [0.150] 
Part-time  -0.224 -0.226 -0.451 -0.331 -0.201 -0.243 
  [0.049]*** [0.189]  [0.177]**  [0.053]*** [0.174] [0.086]*** 
public  0.099 -0.131 0.071 -0.015 0.083 -0.088 
  [0.027]***  [0.106] [0.117] [0.020] [0.083] [0.089] 
rural  -0.179 0.194 0.228 -0.099 0.005 -0.029 
  [0.028]***  [0.095]** [0.115]*  [0.026]*** [0.085]  [0.081] 
Unempl   -0.023 -0.04 -0.017  -0.019  -0.036  -0.027 
  [0.004]*** [0.013]***  [0.011]  [0.003]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** 
High Roma   -0.067 0.028 -0.046 -0.081 0.161 0.156 
  [0.025]*** [0.148]  [0.130] [0.019]*** [0.125]  [0.104] 
Constant  3.502 4.129 3.775 3.399 3.914 4.203 
   [0.144]*** [0.486]*** [0.463]*** [0.129]*** [0.731]*** [0.452]*** 
Obs  2336 271  104 2795 216  93 
R-squared  0.18 0.15 0.22  0.2  0.24 0.24 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: UNECE Generations and Gender Surveys. 
 
  Again we analyze differentials in returns to education. Like in the previous 
analysis schooling is considered endogenous. Moreover, as usual in earnings 
equations it is necessary to correct for selection bias and this is particularly important 
in this context because of minorities’ low employment rates. The selection bias arises 
from the fact that for unemployed individuals there is no information on earnings, and 
thus the corresponding observations cannot be used when estimating the earnings 
equation. As a consequence the analysis is limited to a non-random sample constituted 
only by those who report positive earnings. As it is likely that those factors that 
influence the employment probability also influence the earnings equation, we 
estimate the probability of being employed on the whole sample and correct the 
earnings equation contemporaneously. We control for selection bias using as 
exclusion restrictions the number of children, married status and health status. While 
the first two variables might influence labor market participation decisions especially 
of women, the last one is a good instrument for both genders.  
 
  In table 7 we report in the following order separately for males and females: 
OLS results, then results controlling only for the selection bias, 2SLS controlling for 
the endogeneity of schooling and then results controlling both for the schooling 
endogeneity and selection bias.  





OLS, 2SLS and LIML regression results 
  OLS 2SLS  selection  2SLS schooling  LIML 
    males fem. males fem. males fem. males fem. 
Schooling 0.072  0.067  0.068  0.065 0.123 0.109 0.128 0.107 
 [0.006]***  [0.004]***  [0.006]***  [0.004]***  [0.013]*** [0.010]*** [0.013]*** [0.009]*** 
T*school -0.042 -0.058 -0.052 -0.066 0.006 -0.089 -0.046 -0.097 
 [0.019]**  [0.015]***  [0.014]***  [0.011]***  [0.030] [0.021]***  [0.026]*  [0.017]*** 
R*school -0.049 -0.048 -0.052 -0.054 -0.068 -0.076 -0.088 -0.084 
 [0.014]***  [0.012]***  [0.018]***  [0.015]***  [0.032]** [0.026]***  [0.033]***  [0.023]*** 
Turk 0.476  0.702  0.575  0.818 0.067 1.141 0.665 1.258 
 [0.208]**  [0.190]***  [0.154]***  [0.126]***  [0.331]  [0.241]*** [0.283]** [0.188]*** 
Roma 0.307  0.365  0.449  0.508 0.707 0.836  1.01  0.99 
 [0.127]**  [0.122]***  [0.161]***  [0.131]***  [0.282]** [0.229]***  [0.286]***  [0.188]*** 
age 0.031  0.027  -0.002  -0.003 0.023 0.022 -0.015 -0.015 
 [0.007]***  [0.006]***  [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.007]*** [0.006]***  [0.008]*  [0.008]* 
age2 -0.041  -0.032  0.002  0.006 -0.031 -0.024 0.017 0.022 
 [0.008]***  [0.008]***  [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.009]*** [0.008]***  [0.010]*  [0.010]** 
Self- empl  0.28  0.233  0.276 0.215 0.263 0.208 0.244 0.186 
 [0.045]***  [0.041]***  [0.040]***  [0.031]***  [0.039]*** [0.031]*** [0.041]*** [0.032]*** 
Part time  -0.223  -0.284  -0.342  -0.365 -0.187 -0.261 -0.315 -0.361 
 [0.050]***  [0.050]***  [0.049]***  [0.040]***  [0.046]*** [0.037]*** [0.050]*** [0.040]*** 
public 0.078  -0.013  -0.073  -0.117 0.032 -0.068 -0.13 -0.186 
 [0.026]***  [0.019]  [0.034]**  [0.028]***  [0.031] [0.024]***  [0.036]***  [0.031]*** 
rural -0.105  -0.075  -0.099  -0.048 -0.032 -0.015 -0.024 0.014 
 [0.027]***  [0.024]***  [0.029]***  [0.024]**  [0.031] [0.027] [0.033] [0.027] 
unempl -0.025  -0.021  -0.022  -0.018 -0.026  -0.02  -0.022 -0.017 
 [0.003]***  [0.003]***  [0.003]***  [0.002]***  [0.003]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]*** 
H Roma  -0.068  -0.063  -0.087  -0.077 -0.054 -0.063 -0.069 -0.075 
 [0.025]***  [0.019]***  [0.028]***  [0.021]***  [0.027]** [0.021]*** [0.028]** [0.021]*** 
Constant 3.56 3.384  4.478  4.115 3.025 2.878 3.938 3.763 
   [0.138]***  [0.127]***  [0.174]***  [0.178]*** [0.199]*** [0.168]*** [0.209]*** [0.179]*** 
Obs  2709 3103 4924 6032 2711 3104 4924 6032 
R-squared  0.19 0.21      0.14 0.18     
First stage statistics  Partial R2  Partial R2     
Schooling       0.2161  0.205    
T*school       0.1741  0.2795    
R*school       0.3431  0.3322    
       F(12,2686)  F(12,3080)    
Schooling       61.71  66.19    
T*school       47.17  99.56    
R*school       116.93  127.67    
Source: UNECE Generations and Gender Surveys. 
 
  To control both for the endogeneity of schooling and for the selection bias, we 
basically estimate a five equations recursive model with maximum likelihood 
(LIML): a normal wage equation, three schooling equations (one for each group) and 
one selection equation.  
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where the second and third equations have been analyzed in the previous section. The 
second equation is estimated for each ethnic group. The first equation is the wage 
equation where ln w is the natural logarithm of earnings of individual i, S is the years 
of schooling, and the covariates  include age and age squared, dummies for 




  Controlling for the endogeneity of schooling raises returns to education for all 
groups but more so for the majority, increasing the differential with minority groups, 
while controlling for selection reduces returns to education in some cases dramatically 
as for Turkish males.  Results in last two columns show that returns to education are 
significantly lower for Roma (both males and females) and for Turkish women. 
Returns for Turkish men are lower but the difference with the majority population is 
only marginally significant. 
 
  This is in contrast to O’Higgins (2010) results that wage returns to education 
for Roma and non-Roma are relatively similar. On the contrary, our results 
corroborate the idea that lower educational attainment by minorities is at least partly 
motivated by lower perceived returns both in terms of earnings and in terms of 
employment. 
 
V.  Conclusions 
 
  This paper analyzes the factors determining  employment and wages for ethnic 
minorities in Bulgaria. It shows that in spite of the fact that individuals belonging to 
ethnic minorities and who could achieve secondary schooling have a probability of 
20-25 per cent higher than illiterates to find gainful employment, minorities have very 
low incentives to invest in education given the lower returns - with respect to the 
majority population - in terms of prospective employment and wages in the labor 
market.  
 
  The relatively low returns to education for disadvantaged minorities in general 
and the Roma minority in particular, should be considered by the policy makers 
designing policies that aim to break the vicious cycle: poor education, poor labor 
market outcomes, poverty, welfare dependency. Given existing fertility patterns, it is 
likely that minorities will make up a growing share of the population over time. 
Integrating them into the workforce could boost growth through heightened 
productivity, new skills, increased consumption and investment. Moreover, lower 
requirements for welfare spending would enable the government to invest in 
infrastructure and raise productive capacity (UNDP 2005, World Bank 2010). 
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  The analysis of the situation of disadvantaged ethnic minorities on the labor 
market, based on the initial generations and gender survey of Bulgaria, implies that 
forward-looking policies are needed for their social and economic integration in a 
number of areas, including education, health, housing, labor market and social 
security. Among these the issue of gainful employment constitutes an important 
precondition for successful social integration.     
 
  The high unemployment rate of minorities is most frequently considered to be 
a consequence of supply-side factors such as the low or absent educational 
qualifications; lack of relevant work skills, and their concentration in economically 
depressed regions. Results in this paper support this view suggesting that improving 
education levels of minorities could help reducing a big part of the employment gap. 
However, for Roma apart of education differences, and family structure for females,  
few other observable characteristics can explain the employment differential. The 
high percentage of unexplained employment gap could be attributed not only to 
unobserved differences in education quality, other skills and/or preferences but also - 
as claimed in many other studies (ERRC 2007, UNDP 2002 and 2005, Ringold et al. 
2006) - to discrimination. 
 
  Against this background, labor market policies will thus need to improve 
employability and labor market competence of vulnerable groups through active 
policies and also tackle discrimination with well designed affirmative actions.
19 Given 
the important share of the working age population excluded by the labor market it is 
particularly important to involve private businesses in this exercise without relying 
exclusively on public work programmes.  In addition, the desegregation of public 
education and decisive improvement of its quality in low-income districts are needed 
in order to reduce racial prejudice and upgrade the education and skills of Roma and 
Turkish children and youth with a view to improving their employability in the formal 
sector of the economy. This would in the longer term also improve the sustainability 
of the Bulgarian social-security system as a whole.  
 
                                                 
19Recent evidence shows that to tackle discrimination a mixture of approaches is needed including anti-
discrimination legislation, proactive equality policies and positive actions (ERRC 2007).  
 19Ethnic patterns of returns to education in Bulgaria: Do minorities have an incentive to 
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Annex 1: GGP data 
 
  We use data from the surveys collected in the framework of the Generations & 
Gender Programme (GGP). The GGP is made of two major components, totally 
independent from each other at the data gathering level, but that could be interactive 
at the statistical analysis level: the Generations & Gender Survey (GGS) and the 
Contextual Database (CDB). The GGS consists of a panel survey of three waves 
(three years apart) in which 10 000 individuals aged from 18 to 80 are followed. The 
CDB on the other hand, relates to more than 200 variables, of national and/or regional 
level, sometimes qualitative but more frequently quantitative (time series from 1970 
up to present in most cases), related to a wide range of topics: health, economy, 
employment, culture, education, demography, pensions, etc.  
 
  While for some topics, as for example welfare state provisions and educational 
systems, we referred to the CDB, our main source of data is the GGS. The surveys are 
nationally representative surveys which ensure international comparability of data at 
least for the core questionnaire. Some of the modules are optional, e.g. housing, 
ethnicity and nationality, previous partners, intention to break-up, preventing some 
cross country comparisons. The first wave was conducted in 2004 for Bulgaria. The 
GGS questionnaire covers a wide range of topics related to the household and the 
relations among genders and generations. Main respondents can be either men or 
women aged between 18 and 80. 
 
Annex Table 1 
 Majority  Turkish  minority  Roma 
  m f m f m f 
Obs 4119  5073  511  568  295  391 
percentage 83.9%  9.85%  6.26% 
age  39.8 38.6 37.6 37.0 33.5 33.8 
  13.5 12.8 12.5 12.0 11.3 11.4 
education  12.9 13.6  9.8  9.3  6.9  5.9 
  2.58 2.87 3.47 3.86 3.78 3.87 
education father  10.6 11.0  6.3  6.3  4.1  4.  1 
  4.08 4.10 4.48 4.44 3.81 4.09 
education mother  10.5 11.0  5.1  5.7  3.5  3.4 
  4.27 4.15 4.24 4.34 3.47 3.74 
education partner  13.3  13.3 9.1 10.1 6.4  7.0 
  2.96 2.69 3.66 3.44 3.74 3.90 
Bulgarian native 
language   0.991 0.990 0.041 0.035 0.082 0.123 
  0.093 0.098 0.199 0.184 0.274 0.329 
Bulgarian used at home   0.993 0.995 0.092 0.099 0.163 0.254 
  0.080 0.067 0.289 0.298 0.370 0.436 
employed  0.670 0.612 0.505 0.398 0.313 0.224 
  0.470 0.488 0.500 0.489 0.460 0.415 
Low skilled occupation  0.298 0.177 0.435 0.353 0.620 0.595 
  0.458 0.382 0.497 0.479 0.488 0.493 
Low skilled occ father  0.380 0.368 0.515 0.501 0.578 0.557 
  0.485 0.482 0.500 0.500 0.495 0.497 
Missing info  (occ father)  0.056 0.061 0.041 0.057 0.058 0.077 
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  0.229 0.240 0.199 0.232 0.234 0.267 
Low skilled occ mother  0.316 0.306 0.395 0.395 0.486 0.472 
  0.465 0.461 0.489 0.489 0.501 0.500 
Missing info (occ 
mother)  0.015 0.014 0.012 0.022 0.020 0.021 
  0.122 0.116 0.111 0.147 0.142 0.142 
with parents at 15  0.929 0.923 0.940 0.915 0.918 0.913 
  0.258 0.267 0.238 0.278 0.274 0.283 
village at 15  0.370 0.335 0.698 0.704 0.548 0.550 
  0.483 0.472 0.459 0.457 0.499 0.498 
rural area  0.239 0.198 0.630 0.599 0.554 0.540 
  0.427 0.400 0.483 0.490 0.498 0.499 
Number of children  0.754  1.01 1.21 1.53 1.66 1.93 
  0.912 0.924 1.198 1.196 1.621 1.590 
Married  0.569 0.621 0.587 0.614 0.405 0.442 
  0.495 0.485 0.493 0.488 0.493 0.496 
Co-resident partner  0.623 0.678 0.749 0.748 0.766 0.775 
  0.485 0.467 0.434 0.434 0.424 0.418 
house owner  0.385 0.395 0.308 0.303 0.177 0.177 
  0.487 0.489 0.462 0.460 0.382 0.382 
Number of siblings  1.130 1.151 2.291 2.368 3.112 3.347 
  1.078 1.089 1.865 1.783 2.057 2.072 
Self-employed  0.155 0.130 0.211 0.200 0.109 0.092 
  0.349 0.326 0.383 0.383 0.290 0.288 
part time  0.079 0.064 0.130 0.140 0.250 0.230 
  0.260 0.236 0.311 0.329 0.403 0.404 
Earnings  151.8 119.0 144.5 128.8  82.5  67.6 
  267.3 110.8 253.6 239.9  78.6  56.2 
Poor Health (age 17 -45)  0.104 0.128 0.128 0.139 0.126 0.124 
  0.305 0.335 0.334 0.346 0.333 0.330 
Poor Health (age 46 -65)  0.331 0.459 0.415 0.538 0.543 0.586 
  0.474 0.499 0.495 0.498 0.504 0.487 
Access to toilet  0.848 0.878 0.421 0.394 0.184 0.219 
  0.359 0.328 0.494 0.489 0.388 0.414 
Living in humid dwelling  0.188 0.202 0.302 0.267 0.510 0.545 
  0.391 0.402 0.459 0.443 0.501 0.499 
Nr disabled HH members  0.094 0.099 0.194 0.125 0.197 0.146 
  0.343 0.393 0.467 0.420 0.460 0.400 
 
 